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Offensive Cyber Operations and Future Littoral Operating
Concepts
JD Work

Abstract
Introduction of new ground-launch cruise missile options to hold adversary naval
targets at risk in order to support conventional deterrence objectives through sea
control and sea denial missions is the centerpiece of proposed reorganization of
Marine Littoral forces, as part of new “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations,”
and “Littoral Operations in Contested Environments” concepts. Effective
distributed sea control fires against pacing threat maritime formations requires
defeat of integrated air defense systems. Offensive cyber operations capabilities
may be considered as a means of altering the calculus of attrition in missile fires
exchanges, but due to various sensitivities it has been difficult to date to discuss
these options in unclassified literature. Simulated engagements in contemporary
commercial off-the-shelf wargaming software are used to offer unique insights into
the problem space. Findings from simulated engagements suggest high payoff
options for integrated effects, as well as highlighting the importance of certain
missile design characteristics, seeker operation modes, and battery operations. The
results of these simulations once again validate longstanding principles of naval
combat, and suggest that offensive cyber capabilities may provide useful advantage
by exacerbating tactical fires instability. However, this analysis further highlights
the access, exploitation, and payload tailoring challenges posed by complex
heterogenous adversary networks - suggesting a problem space that rapidly moves
from the question of cyber fires in fleet problems, to the questions of the saboteur’s
dilemma.

Introduction
“Far-called our navies melt away;
On dune and headland sinks the fire…”
Recessional, Rudyard Kipling (1897)

The U.S. Marine Corps has embarked upon a strategy of radical transformation in
order to provide unique warfighting capabilities in service of a nation facing
renewed great power competition and potential conflict far different than the kinds
of fights encountered in the long years of the Global War on Terror. At the
centerpiece of this effort is the forward deployment of mobile, anti-ship surface to
surface missile armed forces capable of holding adversary naval formations at risk
in order to contest revisionist claims to key strategic chokepoints and other littoral
waters. In many ways, this “new” concept is a return to a fundamental early mission
of the Corps, in support of the Fleet and aligned with the National Defense Strategy

Published by Digital Commons @ University of South Florida, 2022

1

Military Cyber Affairs, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 3

that seeks to restore competitive military advantage in order to deter adversaries
from challenging the present liberal international order.1
However, these adversary formations will not be undefended, and in fact
each will represent a complex integrated air defense network that pose unique
challenges for the selection, positioning, and employment of these Marine Littoral
forces’ new missile capabilities. The contest between littoral fires and afloat
missile intercept is a kind of engagement that has been rarely observed in the real
world to date since the first anti-ship missile was fired in anger during the Six-Day
War in 1967.2 Despite the proliferation of these capabilities in naval service
worldwide, paucity of the historical case record has given some observers pause in
evaluating the potential effectiveness of new force options given the need to defeat
modern adversary surface to air missile systems. While the notable recent case of
the reported success of Ukrainian coastal defense Neptune (modified SS-C-6
SENNIGHT / SS-N-25 SWITCHBLADE / 3M24 Kh35 URAN), batteries in
sinking the Project 1164 Slava (Atlant) class cruiser Moskva in April 2022, offers
strong potential evidence for the underlying proposition, questions of Russian fleet
readiness still hang over the action.3
Nonetheless, contemporary naval
engagements are also likely to be marked by the introduction of novel offensive
cyber operations capabilities that will also fundamentally change the outcomes of
these intercept problems – capabilities for which there is no public historical record.
It is true that such capabilities have been considered for decades in the naval
operations context, indeed arguably first arising as a military innovation from the
requirement to hold at risk Soviet Fleet targets whose deployments proved
otherwise challenging to then contemporary U.S. conventional forces.4 However,
unclassified discussion of such concepts has remained difficult. Potential cyber
fires employment in support of conventional littoral operations for sea control and
sea denial has not been addressed in academic, professional military education
literature to date.
1

James Winnefeld. "The 20th-Century Roots of EABO.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol
147 No 2. February 2021.; Gordon Emmanuel. "Smash Bullies: Interpreting the 'why' behind our
Commandant’s Force Design Report." Marine Corps Gazette. June 2020.; Sascha H. Rackwitz.
"Clausewitz, Corbett, And Corvettes." Center for International Maritime Security. 17 April 2020.
http://cimsec.org/clausewitz-corbett-and-corvettes/43475 ; B. A. Friedman. 21st Century Ellis:
Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era. Naval Institute Press. 2015. ; David J.
Ulbrich. "Clarifying the Origins and Strategic Mission of the U.S. Marine Corps Defense
Battalion, 1898–1941.” War and Society. Vol 17 Issue 2: 81-109. 1999. ; Earl H. Ellis. "Advanced
Base Operations in Micronesia.” U.S. Marine Corps. 1921.
2
John C. Schulte. "An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in
Littoral Warfare.” Naval Postgraduate School. September 1994.; Alon Ben-David. "Israel Navy
caught out by Hizbullah hit on corvette.” Jane's Defence Weekly. 26 July 2006. ; Jeremy Binnie,
Neil Gibson. "UAE's Swift likely hit by C-801 missile.” Jane's Defence Weekly. 7 October 2016.;
Jeremy Binnie. "U.S. says missiles launched against destroyer in Red Sea.” Jane's Defence
Weekly. 10 October 2016.
3
Manash Pratim Boruah, “Ukraine conflict: Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet flagship sinks.”
15 April 2022.
4
Craig J. Wiener. "Penetrate, Exploit, Disrupt, Destroy: The Rise Of Computer Network
Operations As A Major Military Innovation.” George Mason University. 2016.
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This study explores the hitherto unexamined problem space through the use
of unclassified wargaming and simulation tools, providing unique insights into the
exchange of fires in salvo warfare where offensive cyber options may provide
advantage in what would otherwise be a brutal calculus of attrition pitting incoming
antiship missiles against area defense and point defense interceptors. We consider
the challenges and outcomes involved in access to, and exploitation of, multiple
complex heterogenous military systems and networks afloat. We identify the need
for maximization of what may be scarce options to achieve most significant impact
for high payoff systems targets. These high payoff outcomes include particular
advantages obtained when focusing Offensive Cyber Operation (OCO) effects in
support of low-observable, passive terminal seeker operating mode antiship missile
designs and to degrade adversary cooperative air defense engagement processes.
Integration of OCO engagement options with optimized missile targeting
allocation, autonomous dynamic terminal engagement re-allocation, and
prospective new Electronic Warfare (EW) options are also discussed. These
simulations highlight the complexities of Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) competition, and the need to focus on battery signature
management. While OCO effects are shown to be most effective at the margins of
engagement envelopes, these findings reinforce well known principles of naval
combat and highlight disproportionate impact of even relatively small advantages.
This is due to the tactical instability that characterizes contemporary naval missile
exchanges arising from the concentration of combat power relative to survivability.
Select OCO effects demonstrate the potential to exacerbate this instability, and
contribute to victory in these types of engagements.

Background and Context – Fleet Problems
In May 1898, a Navy and Marine Corps element conducted one of the first
expeditionary actions to deny and degrade adversary networks in the littoral
environment, destroying a key communications node near Cienfuegos, Cuba—a
small-but-strategic port named the city of a “Hundred Fires.” 5 The raid completed
the ongoing blockade of the Spanish controlled island, denying not only sea lanes
of communication to the enemy, but also communications in the then nascent cyber
domain of what has been called the “Victorian Internet.” 6 The mission was not
without cost—the small boats used by the cable-cutting teams were exposed to
shore fires of murderous intensity from a responding Spanish infantry regiment as
Evelyn M. Cherpak. "Cable Cutting at Cienfuegos." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. February
1897.; Hermann Jacobsen. "Sketches from the Spanish-American War.” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. January 1899.; Caspar F. Goodrich. "The St. Louis' Cable Cutting." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings. March 1900. ; Carlos C. Hanki. "The Cable Cutters of Cienfuegos.” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings. March 1931.; Jonathan Reed Winkler. "Silencing the Enemy: CableCutting in the Spanish–American War.” War on the Rocks. 6 November 2015.
https://warontherocks.com/2015/11/silencing-the-enemy-cable-cutting-in-the-spanish-americanwar/
6
Tom Standage. The Victorian Internet. London: Walker & Co. 1998.
5
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the raiders struggled to destroy the hardened connection with improvised tooling
ill-suited to the task, resulting in two Americans killed and fifteen wounded in
action. Naval gunfire support and raiding party covering fires would nonetheless
exact an estimated three hundred enemy killed. Since this early example, operations
in the information environment have been inextricably intertwined with sea control.
One hundred twenty-two years later, we find ourselves once again grappling
with the questions raised by missions to deny and degrade adversary networks as
we explore new concepts for distributed maritime operations, expeditionary
advanced base operations, and littoral operations in contested environments. We
stand at a unique inflection point, as the Navy and Marine Corps look to the
“Terrible 20’s” and the hard choices that the geopolitical, strategic, and budgetary
realities of the decade will bring for future fleet and force design.7 These choices
will play out against a constant optempo drumbeat of requirements imposed by
combatant commands facing renewed great power competition and the continuing
unresolved challenges of the “lesser included” transnational problems of counterterrorism, counter-proliferation and other key priorities essential to defense of U.S.,
allied, and partner interests in every theatre.8
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) have sought sweeping changes they believe are needed to ensure Marine
elements may effectively serve as the nation’s naval expeditionary force-inreadiness, a force that will leverage the power of the integrated fleet in order to
maintain a persistent naval forward presence enabling sea control and denial
Bryan McGrath. “When (Bad) Strategy Drives Resources.” cdrsalamander blog. 7 April 2022.
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2022/04/when-bad-strategy-drives-resources.html ; CDR
Salamander. "We Chose Decline.” cdrsalamander blog. 29 March 2022.
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2022/03/we-chose-decline.html ; CDR Salamander. "The
Terrible 20s Emerge from the Fog.” 21 September 2021. cdrsalamander blog. 21 September 2021.
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2021/09/the-terrible-20s-emerge-from-fog.html ; CDR
Salamander. "The Post-COVID-19 Natsec Environment." 28 April 2020. cdrsalamander blog.
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2020/04/the-post-covid-19-natsec-environment.html; CDR
Salamander. "The Terrible 20s meet the Tiffany Navy.” cdrsalamander blog. 2 December 2014.
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-terrible-20s-meet-tiffany-navy.html ; CDR
Salamander. "What Does the Exit Point from the 'Terrible 20” Look Like?" U.S. Naval Institute
Blog. 24 July 2019. https://blog.usni.org/posts/2019/07/24/what-does-the-exit-point-from-theterrible-20-look-like; CDR Salamander. "The Terrible 20s is About More Than Money.”
cdrsalamander blog. 28 January 2016. http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-terrible20s-is-about-more-than.html; CDR Salamander. "The Terrible 20s in a Picture." cdrsalamander
blog. 23 October 2013. http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2013/10/the-terrible-20s-in-picture. ;
CDR Salamander. "Towards the 'Terrible 20’s'.” U.S. Naval Institute Blog. 10 February 2010.
https://blog.usni.org/posts/2010/02/10/towards-the-terrible-20s
8
Andrew Kramer and Martin Schroeder. "The Navy Needs a Gray-Zone Strategy.” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings. Vol 146 Issue 6. June 2020. ; Bradford Dismukes. "The Return of GreatPower Competition—Cold War Lessons about Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Defense of
Sea Lines of Communication.” Naval War College Review. Vol 70 No 3. Summer 2020.; Hal
Brands, Evan Braden Montgomery. "One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for
Great-Power Competition.” Texas National Security Review. Vol 3, Iss 2: 80-92. Spring 2020. ;
Mark D. Miles and Charles R. Miller. "The Great Power Competition Paradigm.” JFQ. Volume
94, 3rd Quarter 2019. ; Thomas P.M. Barnett. The Pentagon's New Map. Random House, 2005.
7
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operations.9 The idea that the current force and its legacy platforms are not
organized, trained and equipped to execute these re-emerging missions is not
without its controversy and debate, extending even to the most senior ranks of
earlier generations of Marine leadership.10 But guidance from the Corps’ current
leadership is clear.11 They will develop new tactical means, and employ these
means in new ways to provide future decisionmakers with better options,
connecting these options to the strategic ends pursued through joint campaigns that
are naval in character.12
9

Commandant of the Marine Corps. Force Design 2030. March 2020.; Chief of Naval Operations.
A design for maintaining maritime superiority. December 2019.; Commandant of the Marine
Corps. Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG). July 2019.;
10
Ben Wan Beng Ho/ "Shortfalls in the Marine Corps’ EABO Concept.” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. Vol 147 Issue 7. July 2020. ; Jeff Cummings, Scott Cuomo, Olivia A. Garard, And
Noah Spataro. “Getting The Context Of Marine Corps Reform Right.” War on the Rocks. 1 May
2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/getting-the-context-of-marine-corps-reform-right/;
Benjamin Jensen. "The Rest Of The Story: Evaluating The U.S. Marine Corps Force Design
2030.” War on the Rocks. 27 April 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/the-rest-of-thestory-evaluating-the-u-s-marine-corps-force-design-2030/; T. X. Hammes. "Building A Marine
Corps For Every Contingency, Clime, And Place.” War on the Rocks. 15 April 2020.
https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/building-a-marine-corps-for-every-contingency-clime-andplace/; Nathan Fleischaker and Christopher Denzel. "Force 2030 – Divesting: Maneuver Warfare.”
Marine Corps Association. 7 April 2020.https://mca-marines.org/force-2030-divesting-maneuverwarfare/ ; Mark Cancian. "The Marine Corps’ Radical Shift toward China." Center for Strategic
and International Studies. 25 March 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/marine-corps-radicalshift-toward-china; Mark Cancian. "Don’t Go Too Crazy, Marine Corps." War on the Rocks. 8
January 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/dont-go-too-crazy-marine-corps/; Jake Yeager.
"Expeditionary Advanced Maritime Operations: How The Marine Corps Can Avoid Becoming A
Second Land Army In The Pacific.” War on the Rocks. 26 December 2019.
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/expeditionary-advanced-maritime-operations-how-the-marinecorps-can-avoid-becoming-a-second-land-army-in-the-pacific/; David Barno And Nora Bensahel.
"A Striking New Vision For The Marines, And A Wakeup Call For The Other Services.” War on
the Rocks. 1 October 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/a-striking-new-vision-for-themarines-and-a-wakeup-call-for-the-other-services/; Scott Cuomo, Olivia A. Garard, Noah Spataro,
And Jeff Cummings. "Not Yet Openly At War, But Still Mostly At Peace: The Marine Corps’
Roles And Missions In And Around Key Maritime Terrain.” War on the Rocks. 23 October 2018.
https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/not-yet-openly-at-war-but-still-mostly-at-peace-the-marinecorps-roles-and-missions-in-and-around-key-maritime-terrain/ ; Paul K. Van Riper. "Jeopardizing
national security: What is happening to our Marine Corps?” Marine Times. 21 March 2022.
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/21/jeopardizing-nationalsecurity-what-is-happening-to-our-marine-corps/ ; Tim Barrick. "On Future Wars and The Marine
Corps: Asking The Right Questions.” War on the Rocks. 12 April 2022. ; Marinus. "Is the Marine
Corps abandoning maneuver warfare?" Marine Corps Gazette. April 2022. ; Gary C. Lehmann and
Brian Kerg. "A Response to Maneuverist #19.” Marine Corps Gazette. April 2022.
11
David H. Berger. "The Case for Change.” Marine Corps Association. June 2020. https://mcamarines.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Case-for-Change.pdf; David H. Berger And Ryan Evans. "A
Chat With The Commandant: Gen. David H. Berger On The Marine Corps’ New Direction.” War
on the Rocks. 6 April 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/a-chat-with-the-commandant-gendavid-h-berger-on-the-marine-corps-new-direction/ ; David H. Berger. "Notes On Designing The
Marine Corps Of The Future.” 5 December 2019. War on the Rocks.
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/notes-on-designing-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/
12
Art Corbett. "Restoring the Initiative: A Discussion on the Assumptions and Concepts Shaping
the Next Paradigm of Naval Warfare." Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Combat
Development & Integration. 3 December 2019.
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As the Corps pursues development of these new concepts, focus has been
placed on new options for ground-based missile fires in support of sea denial and
sea control operations. Such capabilities to hold adversary vessels at risk are
intended to complicate adversary decision-making, and hopefully to deter future
conflict and militarized adventurism by regional actors that would otherwise pursue
revisionist objectives through the fait accompli gambits and other campaigns
backed by the threat or use of force.13 New Navy and Marine Corps concepts will
exploit positional advantage in the littorals, leveraging core expeditionary and
amphibious operations competencies, to sustain U.S. and Allied presence even in
the face of adversary counter-intervention planning, and associated long-range
precision fires that would threaten traditional deployments using legacy large
platforms.14
The successful execution of engagements involving these smaller,
distributed, highly mobile and lethal forces will demand integrated strategy and
planning, joint all domain command and control, robust ISR, enabled through
resilient survivable networks. These forces will be opposed by adversary forces
that will seek to deny the advantages conferred by these networks, and who will
attempt to degrade systems and their connectivity—including the spectrum,
maritime communications infrastructure, and space-based architectures upon which
much of that connectivity will rely. This will impose new demands on the Fleet to
defend our networks, and contest adversary presence and potential accesses therein.
Changing operational concepts will also present new opportunities to bring
offensive cyber capabilities into the fight in order to deny and degrade adversary
performance and introduce uncertainties for decision-makers already facing
previously unprecedented challenges to their malicious behaviors.
This research examines a selection of offensive cyber operations
engagements and their potential outcomes in support of sea control and sea denial
missions leveraging ground-based maritime precision fires in accordance with
publicly-disclosed, unclassified capabilities and employment options. Scenarios
and engagement parameters were validated in part through collaborative analysis
and discussion, including “Hundred Fires” events held at the Naval War College
and Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative in May and June 2020.15 This
Feng Zhang. "China’s long march at sea: explaining Beijing’s South China Sea strategy, 2009–
2016.” The Pacific Review. March 2019.; Suisheng Zhao. "China and the South China Sea
Arbitration: Geopolitics Versus International Law.” Journal of Contemporary China. Vol 27, issue
109: pp 1-15. 2018. ; Sugio Takahashi. "Development of gray-zone deterrence: concept building
and lessons from Japan’s experience.” The Pacific Review. Vol 31 Issue 6, pp 787-810. 2018.;
James R.Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara. "Deterring China in the ‘Gray Zone’: Lessons of the South
China Sea for U.S. Alliances." Orbis. Volume 61, Issue 3: pp 322-339. 2017. ; James J. Wirtz.
"Life in the 'Gray Zone': observations for contemporary strategists." Defense and Security
Analysis. Vol 33 Issue 2: pp 106-114. 2017.
14
Ryan D. Martinson. "Counter-intervention in Chinese naval strategy.” Journal of Strategic
Studies. March 2020.
15
The author would like to thank Dr. Nina Kollars, Dr. Trey Herr, Col Art Corbett (USMC ret.),
Dr. Xavier Bellekens, Mr. David Strachan, and Ms. Katie Blankenship - along with the many
13
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effort builds on prior work through the Marine Corps University, Krulak Center
and Expeditionary Warfare School on behalf of 12th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine
Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force, in order to consider potential Concepts
of Operations (CONOPS) and new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), as
well as ongoing wargaming conducted by the Command and Staff College (CSC),
the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) and the Training and Education
Command (TECOM) Warfighting Society.16 This work is also a follow on to
earlier wargaming examining cyber operations and related EW / Electromagnetic
Spectrum Operations (EMSO) through different software platforms conducted as
part of prior Marine Corps University SEA DRAGON exercises.17 Ultimately, the
approach for this study is also informed by earlier work at the Naval Postgraduate
School on offshore control, which identified the potential role of littoral missile
forces in holding naval formations at risk, and explored critical missile fires
allocation and defensive intercept questions in salvo warfare.18
Wargaming as a means of testing novel concepts of naval integration,
especially involving new technologies, platforms, and weapons systems, is of
course by no means a recent development. This activity traces its lineage in an
unbroken tradition of exercises within the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps over the
past hundred years, and earlier to the Royal Navy’s first experiments with the Jane’s
naval wargame—albeit to varying degrees of attention and analytic rigor at varying
points within this period. The instrument is at its most useful, however, when the
services are seeking to make sense of changing character of warfare and pursuing
acquisitions, refining strategy, developing doctrine and tactics, and restricting
organization to meet new demands shaped by altered missions as well as differing
adversary capabilities and intentions.19 This almost certainly encapsulates the
current moment in consideration of future Navy and Fleet Marine Force operations.
The “Hundred Fires” study effort aligns with this tradition. However, given that it
involves mere simulation rather than extensive large scale unscripted free maneuver
at sea and in the littorals, the effort should certainly not be taken as guidance, nor
joint, interagency, and multinational event participants for their support to the “Hundred Fires”
efforts; as well as to gratefully acknowledge the unique national perspectives offered by Gen
James Cartwright (USMC ret.) during these conversations.
16
Steven Stansbury. "Wargaming Fleet Problems with Off-the-Shelf Games.” BruteTalk, Krulak
Center. 30 June 2020. ; Thomas J. Gordon IV, James Joyner, and Jorge Benitez. "May Madness:
Competitive Wargaming In A Pandemic.” War on the Rocks. 1 June 2020.
17
Cyber Conflict Documentation Project. “Integration of cyber capabilities in crisis and conflict
simulation: insights from U.S. Marine Corps University SEA DRAGON 3.0 Wargame.” March
2018.
18
Jeffrey R. Kline, Wayne P. Hughes Jr. “Flotilla to Support a Strategy of Offshore Control.”
Naval Postgraduate School. 2013. ; Casey M. Mahon. "A Littoral Combat Model for Land-Sea
Missile Engagements", Naval Postgraduate School. September 2007.
19
Craig C. Felker. Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940
(College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007) ; Albert A. Nofi. To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S.
Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940. Historical Monographs, Naval War College. 2010 ; Christopher
Yi-Han Choy. "British War-Gaming, 1870-1914.” King's College London. August 2013. ; John M.
Lillard. Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II. Potomac Books.
2016. ; Roger C. Mason. "Wargaming: its history and future." The International Journal of
Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 20:2, 77-101 (2018)
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should this work be mistaken for official Combat Development and Integration
planning activity.

Methodology
Engagements between adversary forces and multiple proposed variants of U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps forces were simulated using the commercial off-the-shelf Command Modern
Operations software package. The use of the Command platform has precedent elsewhere
throughout DoD for multiple problems associated with acquisition, logistics, and core
warfighting tactical and doctrine development.20 Its predecessor wargame Harpoon has
been used since the 1980’s in miniatures form, and in the 1990’s as software editions
including in early efforts at the Naval War College.21 A TECOM Warfighting Society
scenario, previously used for wargaming of similar engagements for analysis of future
operating concepts and force design, was selected as baseline. Simulated engagements
occurred within three separate notional littoral areas selected from specific key
INDOPACOM area geographies, representing contested straits and other close and
confined seas. Each engagement took place within a 200 nautical mile (nm) by 200 nm
area, with variable opposing forces geometries representing the conduct of differing transit
and other missions. Weather variables were set to represent low intermittent cloud and
light fog, variable moderate to heavy rains, with sea state conditions 4 to 5.
Simulated engagements were placed within a broader context of theatre-wide posture under
conditions of conflict. U.S. and adversary forces not taking part in specific simulation
actions were nonetheless represented for independent missions, along with neutral shipping
and other third-party vessels and aircraft operations, in order to represent complexity of the
battlespace and to simulate higher echelon factors that may influence a specific
engagement.
Theatre level ISR assets were simulated and contributed to engagements for both sides.
Blue Force theatre assets included: representations of multinational allied national
technical means providing imagery, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT) and other Measurement & Signature Intelligence (MASINT) capabilities,
commercial satellite imagery assets, P8 maritime patrol aircraft, MQ-4C Triton and RQ180A unmanned aerial vehicle systems, U-2S reconnaissance platform, as well as E-2D
Hawkeye, E-3 Sentry, E-767 and E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning (AEW)
platforms. Adversary theatre assets included: Yaogan / Jian Bing overhead imagery, SAR,
and SIGINT platforms, Over the Horizon-Backscatter (OTH-B) and Over the HorizonSurface Wave (OTH-SW) radar, terrestrial SIGINT / Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
stations, EA-03 Soar Dragon, Wing Loong II, BZK-005, and CH-5 Rainbow Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAVs), and GaoXin YJ-8 special mission aircraft, and KJ-200 / YJ-9 AEW
platforms.22
20

Iain McNeil. "Bringing Commercial games to Defence.” Military Operations Research Society.
15 April 2020.
21
Matthew B. Caffrey Jr. On Wargaming: How Wargames Have Shaped History and How They
May Shape the Future. Naval War College Press. 2019.
22
Jane's Intelligence Review. "Satellite imagery shows UAV display at China’s Malan air base.”
26 November 2019.; Jane's. “Chinese Electronic Mission Aircraft.” 27 June 2019. ; Jane’s.
“Reviewing militarisation in the South China Sea.” 4 October 2018. ; Jane’s Intelligence Review.
“China expands short-range maritime ISR capabilities.” 29 December 2017. ; Jane's Intelligence
Review. "China integrates long-range surveillance capabilities." 1 November 2017.
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Control group simulations
An initial series of engagements between were simulated between pacing threat adversary
formations and Blue Force units in order to establish a baseline observation set
encompassing differing sensor, weapons systems, and operating condition mixes. Since
this activity is explicitly not intended to assess platform selection or other comparative
capabilities choices currently under consideration as part of future force design efforts, but
rather the contribution of OCO options in differing scenarios, a robust range of potential
force options based on publicly disclosed planning factors were gamed in order to ensure
neutral observations. Due to announced focus on specific strike platforms including Naval
Strike Missile, Maritime Strike Tomahawk, and a ground-based anti-ship ballistic missile
capability (GB-ASBM), some systems did receive greater attention as part of a larger
number of scenarios.23 However, other comparative U.S. and Allied missile systems were
also simulated to control for variables associated with weapons system design
characteristics—including Harpoon, Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Exocet,
and Hsiung Feng III platforms.
Some additional allied systems were considered for simulation, but could not be
accurately modeled in the absence of effective terminal seeker design information for
engagement of naval targets where the original fielded system may not have been intended
for such roles, including the MdCN (Missile De Croisière Naval, a SCALP-EG / STORM
SHADOW variant), Hyunmoo-3B, and BrahMos. Other adversary missile capabilities
were also simulated in order to provide an alternative baseline of foreign weapons systems
observations, including CSS-N-8 Saccade / YJ-83 / C802, SS-C-6 SENNIGHT / SS-N-25
SWITCHBLADE / 3M24 (Kh35) URAN, SS-C-5 STOOGE / SS-N-26 STROBILE / K300P Bastion-P, SS-N-27 SIZZLER / 3M54T Kalibr, Khalij Fars [Fateh 110 Mod] ASBM,
DF21-D / CSS-5 Mod 5, and DF-26 ASBM. Alternative systems simulation provided
control group data by which to evaluate variables of offensive cyber effects separately from
variations in missile performance characteristics. Systems were modeled under the
assumption that previous Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty restrictions would no longer
remain in force, following U.S. withdrawal from this agreement after unaddressed Russian
forces violations with the deployment of operational SS-C-8 SCREWDRIVER/ 9M729
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) batteries in February 2017.24 Despite ongoing
discussion of hypersonic glide vehicle weapons in both U.S. and foreign testing, current
USMC thinking has not yet moved in this direction despite apparent foreign belief that
such systems would be a natural evolutionary pathway of the concept. 25 These systems
were therefore excluded from scope of this paper.
23

Megan Eckstein. "Marines Will Field Portfolio of JLTV-Mounted Anti-Ship Weapons in the
Pacific" U.S. Naval Institute. 11 March 2020. ; Richard Burgess. "Commandant: Tomahawks Will
Enable Marines to Contribute to Sea Control, Denial.” Sea Power Magazine. 5 March 2020. ; Sam
LaGrone. "Raytheon to Arm Marine Corps with Anti-Ship Missiles in $47M Deal.” U.S. Naval
Institute. 8 May 2019. ; Megan Eckstein. "Marines Want to Field a Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
‘As Fast As Possible’.” U.S. Naval Institute. 19 February 2019.
24
Shannon Bugos, “U.S. Completes INF Treaty Withdrawal,” Arms Control Today, 19:7, 24-25.
(2019)
25
Andrew Jensen. “China’s Reactions to USMC Pursuit of GBASM Systems.” Seeing Red.
Deputy Commandant for Information, Vandegrift Team. 2 July 2020. ; Megan Eckstein. "DARPA
Asked Marines to Consider Adding Land-Based Hypersonic Weapons to Arsenal, But USMC Not
Interested.” USNI News. 18 June 2020.
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All Blue Force systems, regardless of individual munitions selection, were
simulated as part of notional restructured USMC expeditionary elements consistent with
the Marine Littoral Regiment concept. Opposing forces were modeled across five different
notional adversary missions: a carrier strike group, an expeditionary strike group, a naval
surface action group, an escorted shipping convoy, and a light patrol formation
(representing adversary harassment or commerce raiding missions).26 Forces were
represented variably operating under Emissions Control (EMCON) for low signature
maneuver, or using full active sensor options (including air search and surface search
radars) for force protection. Forces under EMCON restrictions could be cued by theatre
level ISR assets or organic passive sensor detection (including passive radar systems, or
other radar warning receivers / Electronic Support Measure [ESM] / ELINT systems)
alerting to incoming threats, in which case units would react with appropriate immediate
use of active sensors.
Traditional current generation EW / EMSO capabilities were represented in control group
simulations. These effects included Electronic Attack (EA) jamming and Electronic
Protect (EP) defensive electronic countermeasures focused on the radio frequency
spectrum, as well as defensive chaff and spectral decoy systems. Advanced cyber –
electromagnetic activity (CEMA) options were not represented in conventional control
engagements due to limited public detail; these were considered in abstracted fashion under
the range of offensive cyber effects simulated as part of experimental engagements (as
discussed below).

Simulating Offensive Cyber Effects
Wargaming offensive cyber operations often faces substantial challenges due classification
limitations. However, the cyber warfighting domain is unique in that a high percentage of
contemporary interactions play out across systems and networks owned and operated by
the private sector. Industry cyber intelligence and other security research therefore can
provide a robust foundation for unclassified simulation of representative cyber capabilities.
While the fidelity of these options may not be fully representative of unique “NOBUS”
(Nobody But U.S.) classified TTP that perhaps might be considered in other settings, there
remains substantial utility in understanding the substantial insights possible solely from the
open source. In particular, the open-source intelligence picture becomes even more
important when considering that these topics have been the focus of specific Chinese
government interest and similar analysis is almost certainly being conducted at the
direction of Beijing.27

Access and Effects Abstractions
Based on open-source intelligence and other published analysis, one may observe a range
of potential CONOPs for access and effects delivery against relevant systems and networks
identified within the scenario set. For the purposes of this analysis, much of these activities
26

A fictional scenario describing engagement of a convoy target may be seen in Dustin League
and Dan Justice. "Sink ‘Em All: Envisioning Marine Corps Maritime Interdiction.” Center for
International Maritime Security. 8 June 2020.
27
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Seeing Red. Deputy Commandant for Information, Vandegrift Team. 26 June 2020.
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may be abstracted above the level of technical detail describing tactical interactions “on
the wire” at the level of offensive operator visibility—much as the wargame’s simulation
engine abstracts the specifics of a fighter pilot’s cockpit or ship’s damage control team.
Rather, the appropriate focus is placed at the level of operational effect: representing
compromise of confidentiality, availability, and integrity of targeted compute and the
military utility that depends on that compute. This is consistent with longstanding DoD
and industry cybersecurity practices when evaluating hostile interactions across targeted
systems and networks.28 There is however a solid unclassified basis for asserting
plausibility of these effects in abstracted fashion, briefly summarized as follows.
The maritime domain and littoral operating environment does pose certain unique
problems that are not always specifically identified in finished cyber intelligence which is
traditionally more focused on corporate enterprise and critical infrastructure networks
ashore. These can include: questions of operations involving specific shipboard systems,
satellite links, undersea nodes, and discrete weapons systems elements such as radar and
sonar components, electro-optical and other sensors, missile and torpedo launchers,
navigation components, electronic warfare suites, as well as emerging autonomous
operations logic functions. However, while these unique systems pose new challenges of
access and of exploitation, substantial industry research has identified both potential
vulnerabilities and opportunities, as well as relevant capabilities observed in the wild. Such
research has included exploration of potential compromise of communication datalink
systems, with focus on unmanned systems command and control as well as cooperative
engagement capabilities.29 Satellite communications systems and navigation technologies
have also seen particularly intense focus.30 New research is further extending these
intrusion concepts into novel undersea network technologies.31 The notional compromise
of ship systems also reportedly featured in NATO exercise SABRE GUARDIAN in 2017,
in which planners were forced to consider options for offensive cyber intrusion against a
28

Defense Science Board. Security Controls for Computer Systems. February 1970.
DECLASSIFIED; James P. Anderson. “Computer Security Technology Planning Study.”
Electronic Systems Division, U.S. Air Force. 1972. ; J. H. Saltzer, & M. D. Schroeder, "The
protection of information in computer systems.” Proceedings of the IEEE, 63(9), 1278-1308. 1975
; D. E. Bell, L. J. La Padula. "Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and Multics
Interpretation." Technical Report ESD-TR-75-306, The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA. 1975;
K.J. Biba. “Integrity Considerations for Secure Computer Systems.” Technical Report MTR-3153,
MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA. 1976; David Clark, David Wilson. "A comparison of
commercial and military computer security policies." IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
1987.
29
Daniel Moore. "Targeting technology: Mapping military offensive network operations.” In 10th
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon). Tallinn, Estonia. 29 May - 1 June 2018. ;
Ugur Akyazi. "Possible Scenarios and Maneuvers for Cyber Operational Area." In Andrew
Liaropoulos and George Tsihrintzis [eds]. 13th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and
Security (ECCWS). University of Piraeus, Greece. 3-4 July 2014.; Richard S. Stansbury, Manan
A. Vyas, Timothy A. Wilson. "A Survey of UAS Technologies for Command, Control, and
Communication (C3).” Kimon P. Valavanis, Paul Oh, Les Piegl [eds]. Unmanned Aircraft
Systems. Springer. 2008.
30
Air Force Research Laboratory. "Space Security Challenge (SSC) 2020 Hack-A-Sat (HAS):
Rules." 23 June 2020. ; Colby Moore. "Spread Spectrum Satcom Hacking.” Black Hat USA, Las
Vegas. 2015. ; Ruben Santamarta. "SATCOM Terminals: Hacking by Air, Sea, and Land.” Black
Hat USA, Las Vegas 2014. ; Adam Laurie. "Satellite Hacking for Fun and Profit." Black Hat DC.
2009.
31
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merchant vessel carrying gray arms being smuggled to supply an adversary irregular force
of “little green men,” where OCO effects in this exercise were sought to enable Visit,
Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations. 32
Public information regarding offensive cyber options against Integrated Air
Defense (IADS) networks is more limited. This becomes highly salient when considering
adversary reef fortifications that may provide overwatch to naval formations, or when
analyzing effects against shipboard radar and surface to air missile systems that are
navalized variants of known IADS components. However, open-source analysis has
suggested operational employment of such capabilities in support of strike sorties by Israeli
Air Force, which penetrated defended Syrian airspace to destroy undisclosed nuclear
facilities. The capability employed in this action has never been acknowledged, however
multiple analysts have characterized this as an early cyber network attack (CNA)
example.33 Chinese defense analysts have also quite intently focused on the case in
numerous contexts, alleging similarities to U.S. experimentation and acquisition efforts
known under the term “Project SUTER”.34 Only limited information regarding such
capabilities have been disclosed to date by Department of Defense, and it remains unclear
the extent to which PLA authors have accurately evaluated specific systems or programs.35
However, it is clear that the topic remains quite prominent in their thinking.

Cyber Conflict Documentation Project. “Russian navigation warfare: understanding hostile
intentions and recent incidents.” November 2017.
33
Thomas Rid. "Cyber war will not take place." Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012): 532.; Lior Tabansky, and Isaac Ben Israel. "Striking with Bits? The IDF and Cyber-Warfare." In
Cybersecurity in Israel, pp. 63-69. (Cham: Springer) 2015. Slawomir Dygnatowski, Pawel
Dygnatowski, Lukasz Domzal-Drzewicki. “Analysis Of Using Structural Solutions In
Cybersecurity Based On Orchard Operation.” Journal of Konbin (Air Force Institute of
Technology, Poland). Vol 49. 2019.; Jason Healey, Divyam Nandrajog. "Understanding Cyber
Effects on Battlefield Outcomes. Columbia University. June 2019. ; Robert Dalsjö, Christofer
Berglund, Michael Jonsson. Bursting the Bubble: Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region.
Defense Research Agency (FOI), Ministry of Defense, Sweden. 2019.
34
Min Zhao. "Network Attack of Network Centric Warfare: Project Suter." Journal of Modern
Defence Technology 39, no. 6 (2011): 139-143.; Liu Min, Xing Zhao. "Offense and Defense
Technology in Cyberwar——Analysis on Project Suter." Command Information System and
Technology 4 (2011).; Ren-Quan Huang, Wei-Min Li, Chun-Yang Wang, and Xiao-Jun He.
"UML and petri net model of the air defense system countering the cyber attack." Journal of
Modern Defence Technology 40, no. 2 (2012): 17-23.; Zhou Fang. "Human behavior description
method of cyber countermeasure based on properties combination." Computer Engineering and
Design 8 (2013): 17.; Su Kang, Huang Yan, and Wang Kui. "Study on cyberspace hierarchical
structure and countermeasures function requirement in battlefield." Aerospace Electronic Warfare
3 (2013): 10; Sun Xin Feng, Fei Hong Zhao, and Zhu Hong. "U.S. Military Foundational
Cyberwarfare Plan X." Command Information System and Technology 3 (2013).; Zhang Lu, Hong
Liang, and Chen Wu. "Research of Cyberspace Countermeasure Based on Information
Technology [J]." Computer Technology and Development 24, no. 6 (2014): 208-210.
35
Michael W. Garrambone. "Human Factors: Conducting Over the Shoulder Assessment for
Military Exercises and Experiments.” MORS Workshop: Bringing Analytical Rigor to Joint
Warfighting Experimentation: Design, Planning, Execution, Analysis and Reporting. Military
Operations Research Society. 3-5 October 2006.; John F. Vona. "Global Effects: Pilot Explores
Integrated Command and Control." High Frontier, The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals.
Volume 5, Number 3, May 2009.; Matt J. Butler. "Rapid Delivery of Cyber Capabilities:
Evaluation of the Requirement for a Rapid Cyber Acquisition Process" Air Force Institute of
Technology, Air University. 2012.
32
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Beyond generalized statements about alleged undisclosed prior operations,
however, there is substantial open-source information upon which to identify a range of
likely vulnerabilities and exploitation scenarios in contemporary threat Surface-to-Air
Missile (SAM) systems. Of particular example are onboard computing architectures
incorporated in the design of the S-300 / S-400 platform family. These systems were
originally developed from the 1980’s onward using a proprietary Soviet (and later Russian)
processor architecture iterated across multiple generations.
The latest publicly known variant of this architecture is the ELBRUS chipset and
associated operating system, a clone of Western SPARC processor designs running a
modified variant of an older Linux kernel.36 This Russian computing architecture is known
to have been developed from designs stolen as part of technical espionage operations
against Western firms by the Russian foreign intelligence service.37 The developer claims
proprietary modifications to this processor and its operating system intended to defeat a
number of technical exploitation options commonly used against commercial enterprise
architecture, features which the government of Russia has previously highlighted in earlier
worm-able malware outbreak crisis events.38 However, it remains likely that exploitation
options known to be available against the original SPARC environments may be adapted
to the ELBRUS target. These options include specific vulnerabilities and associated
exploits that remained undisclosed for nearly twenty years in the West.39 Similar options
are almost certainly available against other Russian systems, and their later Chinese
derivatives, including here relevant HQ-17A (a clone of the SA-15 GAUNTLET / TOR)
and HQ-9 systems.

Representative capabilities
While the simulation software developer studio did incorporate some degree of cyber
effects within scenarios intended for commercial release, these are relatively immature in
existing form and were generally not suitable for robust comparative analysis as
constructed. The designers did however offer scripting options to represent additional
capabilities, as well as other robust scenario editing functions that in combination can
deliver viable simulation of key capabilities and associated effects.
Representing the complex systems of systems which must be targeted to achieve
relevant cyber effects under scenario conditions is a substantial challenge. The existing
simulation at present models a wide range of ship, aircraft, and facility systems, along with
their associated networks, and interoperability at varying levels of fidelity depending on
unit type, technology generation, and relevance to previously defined tactical resolution
Sudonull. “Climbing Elbrus - Reconnaissance in battle. Technical Part 1. Registers, stacks and
other technical details.” April 2019.; Sudonull. “Climbing Elbrus - Reconnaissance in battle.
Technical Part 2. Interrupts, exceptions, system timer.” April 2019.
37
JD Work. “Early intelligence assessments of COMBLOC computing.” Journal of Intelligence
History. 2021.
38
Roman M. Rusiaev, Murad I. Neiman-Zade, Alexandr V. Ermolitsky, Valery I. Perekatov,
Vladimir Yu. Volkonsky. "Various Buffer Overflow Detection Means for Elbrus
Microprocessors.” International Conference on Engineering and Telecommunication (EnT).
Moscow. 29-30 November 2016.; Andrew E. Kramer. "Russia, This Time the Victim of a
Cyberattack, Voices Outrage.” New York Times. 14 May 2017.
39
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2 May 2019.
36

Published by Digital Commons @ University of South Florida, 2022

13

Military Cyber Affairs, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 3

factors. Thus, designers have extensively modeled sensor systems and weapons functions,
and have further incorporated elements considering radio communications and datalink
performance (including those operating within a contested electronic warfare spectrum).
Additionally, command and control factors are represented through an Observe, Orient,
Decide, Act (OODA) loop model that simulates a time factor for receipt and action on
changing information.
For the purposes of this study, offensive cyber effects resulting in compromise of
systems and network confidentiality, integrity, and availability were represented through
several mechanisms. The most frequently leveraged mechanism was to designate the
involved specific systems components as having been damaged, as the simulation engine
already incorporated robust mechanisms to model the loss of shipboard, sensor, and
weapon systems functionality within engagements—along with damage control processes
that would result in repair and restoration of components where recoverable. This
mechanism simulated offensive cyber effects seeking to deny or degrade availability,
encompassing both deliberately destructive and optionally reversible effects options.
Additional integrity effects could also be represented, through introduction of simulated
decoy contacts, distorted inventory / ships-stores management, and forced loss of sensor
contact / weapons track. These effects required careful review and manual editing to ensure
simulation fidelity in current generation of the software package. It is hoped that future
software iterations will enable more seamless and robust automation.

Acknowledged simulation limitations
Simulation of offensive cyber effects did not extend to weapon sensor level interactions.
There is likely utility in exploring these effects, especially for systems where the function
of the terminal seeker may prove a critical variable in engagement scenarios. Likewise,
integrity and successful function of individual munitions were not addressed, although
prospective failures of complex systems and associated maintenance and update processes
can readily be envisioned—especially for networked weapons systems reliant on datalinks,
navigation systems, flight planning software, and adaptive fusing mechanisms.
Compromise of processing, exploitation, and dissemination architectures
associated with ISR capabilities were also not simulated; where cyber effects may be
introduced to complicate detection or alter integrity. Effects executed directly against
national technical means, including on-orbit architectures, and their commercial systems
counterparts were also considered out of scope of the current study.
Cyber physical effects through manipulation of shipboard industrial control
systems networks to cause direct damage to the vessel were also not explored. Such
damage mechanisms may be simulated at present, including through events such as failures
of engine or electrical systems resulting in shipboard fire, but were outside the scope of the
study.
Further, no attempt was made here to simulate offensive cyber operations against
nuclear command and control targets. Nuclear weapons systems and their employment
were not considered within the scope of these scenarios.
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Key Insights from Simulated Engagements
Simulated engagement outcomes across 163 actions are presented in appendix, breaking
down variable adversary losses and damaged vessels across various target formations for
both control group engagements testing differing missile types under classic engagement
conditions, versus engagements involving variable OCO options. Despite deliberate
simulation of high numbers of engagements, engagement outcome results were not tested
through quantitative analysis techniques due to the large number of nested variable
conditions represented within the software package. These included changing conditions
related to ISR and weapons sensor performance, unit command / control / communications
and individual systems operator behaviors, electronic warfare / decoy effects, weapons
behavior modeling, weather / environmental conditions, and other factors calculated as part
of the designer’s intent towards offering a high-fidelity representation of contemporary
naval combat. Rather, this effort instead focused on identifying the high level, qualitative
insights that may help inform complex decision-making regarding planning and integration
of offensive cyber operations with new future joint and maritime operating concepts. A
number of useful insights did indeed emerge from watching these simulated engagements
unfold.

Complex Heterogenous Targets
The first and perhaps most central observation is that achieving significant offensive cyber
effects at the tactical level supporting precision ground-based missile fires against targets
afloat necessarily involves access to, and exploitation of, multiple complex heterogenous
military systems and networks. There is no single cyber “silver bullet”. The salient
functional components within an adversary surface warship are substantially varied and
demand unique consideration, especially in ship classes that have undergone
modernization from legacy inventory to more current systems. These are further
complicated by offboard capabilities—including supporting ISR architectures, logistics
systems, precision navigation and timing systems, and communications links. While
commonalities of exploitation options may be explored, there is undoubtably a need to
tailor both delivery and payloads across these diverse equipment sets and configurations.
It is unreasonable to believe that a capability will be in hand for every system, in every
deployment and operational mode, at all times and in all geographic environments. The
substantial investment required to provide high confidence options to combatant
commanders across even a substantial fraction of relevant targets is highlighted.
Having acknowledged this difficulty, these constraints then demand focus on
maximization of what may be scarce options to achieve most significant impact for high
payoff systems targets. Effects intended to deny and degrade engagement management
functions, cooperative engagement capabilities, and associated datalinks demonstrably
offer advantage in achieving greater hit and kill percentages. BELL THUMB, LIGHT
BULB, as well as the newer BAND STAND and HN-900 systems are therefore higher
payoff targets.40 Such advantage may however be fleeting where the adversary may revert
to manual modes of operation. That fleeting window is nonetheless potentially important
within the relentless pace of contemporary missile warfare. Likewise, the ability to deliver
effects where adversary design may have unwisely created centralization of systems
40
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interdependencies suggests the potential for effects to be extended across clusters of
intertwined components, such as where specific industrial control systems components
may allow degradation of power distribution, or where common design features may allow
disruption of shipboard systems. Vertical Launch System (VLS) automation appears to
offer such a candidate target. Embedded VxWorks real time operating system components
and other similar automation technologies are also promising candidate attack surfaces for
such effects.41 However, these unique opportunities may not be tactically addressable in
the context of an immediate engagement—although such engagements were modeled with
results demonstrating that if such targets may be serviced, benefits accrue to the attacker.
While simulation here focused largely on individual functional component impact,
the combined capabilities offered by multiple systems performing variants of the same
function become highly significant. For example, one sees such interactions between
modern air search radars, and overlapping contributions to common operating picture from
surface search radars designed to support detection of incoming sea-skimming cruise
missile contacts. If not anticipated, such redundancy may render ineffective lengthy
investment in certain complex, difficult OCO options.

Low Observable Missile Designs and Terminal Seeker Mode Role in Air Defense
Detection and Intercept
In both control group simulations, and under differing OCO supported engagements, the
design of specific missile systems emerged as a significant feature in outcomes of
adversary ships sunk and / or damaged. Low-observable design characteristics
demonstrated substantial value in all conditions. It is certainly of no surprise to note that
stealth is a game changer in modern missile warfare and air defense problems, and is a
finding consistent with longstanding research.42 Low-observable designs reduce detection
ranges for most air defense radar systems, thereby also reducing adversary reaction time
and window for effective intercept through SAM fires. The percentage of successful
intercepts by SAM and point defense systems is also reduced when operating against lowobservable systems designs, over legacy designs.
Terminal seeker operating modes play a key role in this equation. Even where
airframe signature reduction may have inhibited successful radar track, especially in seaskimming flight profiles where background wave clutter can be significant in some sea
states, active terminal guidance offers the adversary some improved engagement
opportunities. As a result, weapon systems relying on passive infrared imaging sensors
rather than active radar emitters suggest certain advantages, including reduced adversary
reaction time provided by Radar Warning (RWR) and other Electronic Support Measures
(ESM) systems. This advantage however faces tradeoffs when facing multi-spectral
decoys, where multi-mode seekers may be less readily spoofed. In these engagements,
41
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OCO effects against adversary RWR / ESM systems may provide unique advantage. The
growing trend towards integration of such systems into more complex, networked ELINT
architectures also provides potentially useful exploitable attack surfaces. In particular,
PLAN adapted Western equipment like the ELETTRONICA S.p.A. ELT / Newton family
of ESM / ECM solutions is representative of such potential target architecture.43
The introduction of new passive radar systems into these equations likely changes
engagement tactics for both sides. PLAN has actively pursued passive radar adoption for
newer generation ship designs, including the Russian origin Mineral-ME complex.44
Effective OCO and EW options against the interactions between these systems and other
emitter sources in the environment may be unique in ways not simulated here by simple
damage calculations.

High Payoff Effects Against Adversary Sensing and Engagement in Area and Point
Defense
Observed simulated engagements suggest that the highest payoff for offensive cyber effects
comes from impact to degrade adversary cooperative air defense engagement processes.
While direct effects against specific air defense capabilities may be highly desirable, this
is matched with concurrent difficulty in access, exploitation, and payload design. Actions
against battle management functions may therefore yield good result for relative
investment demand. In particular, actions which may degrade performance even where
SAM or point defense systems performance is untouched show promise. These may
include handoff between systems components, including from search to tracking radars,
from radar to weapons datalinks, and from ship to ship. It is important to note that
degraded-but-otherwise-apparently-operational equipment produces critical uncertainty
for adversary leadership in response under fire. In these cases, failure to adapt to ensure
defensive fires from alternative systems even where overlapping options exist may result
in the creation of a window of attacker advantage not otherwise manifest.
These fleeting opportunities are further significant at faster engagement speeds
involving both defender and attacker weapons selections. The performance of certain
foreign supersonic cruise missile systems was highly notable in control group simulations,
demonstrating more effective hits due to shortened defensive engagement windows. Even
OCO effects that may seem marginal for other missile designs therefore may prove to be
more important in engagements involving these systems. Likewise, one sees similar
dynamics in the very short engagement timeframes and intercept envelops that characterize
response to ballistic missile threats, and likely future hypersonic weapons systems.
The value of decoy systems and other penetration aids in defeating integrated air
defense systems targets has long been understood. Substantial payoff is likely found in
cyber effects duplicating these complications for the targeted formation. Where physical
decoy platforms were simulated, key concerns regarding launch techniques emerged given
that traditional decoy systems often did not offer volley fire options nor flight profile
43
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options to match cruise missile delivery system operations. Launch bottlenecks, formation
assembly, and other factors may complicate effective utilization, especially in platforms
with limited fuel inventories and operating ranges. It is therefore natural to look to OCO
options to create similar effects, where kinetic systems pose difficulties. However, it
should be noted that classic radio frequency EW techniques have long offered options to
deliver false contacts, seductive decoys, and other similar effects, and these are complex
interactions that may be less suitable as higher level OCO objectives.

Flight Profile and Pre-Planned / Autonomous Engagement Planning
The role of flight planning in cruise missile fires is also highlighted in these engagements.
The problem of optimized allocation of missiles against multiple targets is a longstanding
area of research interest, and particularly so in recent Chinese military thinking. Multiple
engagement strategies may be considered under differing conditions and against differing
adversary air defense approaches.45
These factors are further complicated by offensive cyber interactions, where
different target system components may be denied or degraded in specific vessels that
service differing roles in layered defense approaches, have different relative positions
within a target formation, against the variables of differing axes of attack based on a given
attacking fires allocation decision. Specific offensive cyber effects impacting attacker
missile waypoint designation and flight profile performance may also be considered, but
were not simulated in the current study. Likewise, allocation of defensive SAM and point
defense fires may be impacted by offensive cyber effects, de-optimizing defender
engagement strategies in ways that may be non-obvious but of substantial advantage in
short, sharp confrontations, especially where surprise may result from successful ambush.
Additional future research to test these variables is likely called for.
Missile flight logic representation in the current simulation engine also did not
permit robust coordinated swarm behaviors. While this is consistent with current weapons
45
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Research Logistics. Vol 54 Issue 1: pp 66-77. 2006. ; LI Da-jian, WANG Feng-shan. "Optimizing
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system platforms, ongoing efforts towards coordinated networked fires permitting dynamic
re-allocation of missiles to targets are now sought by multiple services as part of
aspirational, next generation capabilities. Such features would also be usefully simulated
in future study iterations, and may introduce options for salient cyber effects. These
engagements also point to the increasing future importance of algorithmic warfare, where
operations are not merely aimed to create effects within a specific system or network but
rather in the interactions and decision logics of sensor, processing, and application. These
are new frontiers in offensive cyber operations, the outlines of which are only dimly
glimpsed at present.

Integration with EW Options
Regardless of offensive cyber effects employment decisions, coordinating such effects
with RF spectrum focused EW measures remains critical. EW platforms remain high
demand, low density assets in the current and anticipated joint force. Simulated
engagements highlight the need for a lower cost, attritable capabilities mix. These may
include unmanned systems, expendable munitions, or other unconventional solutions. The
need for integration of these options, including consideration of potential new organic
capabilities for Marine Littoral Regiment force constructs, emerges clearly from
simulation. In particular, a ground launched expendable escort jamming system with
similar signature and flight characteristics as primary missile systems may yield substantial
value for strike elements, especially if such a system is employed in conjunction with
specific offensive cyber effects options. PLA authors have themselves focused recent
interest in similar EW concepts, including development of their own organic capabilities
to support PLAN naval surface action groups, as well as their own “Blue Teaming” analysis
intended to identify countering options for likely anticipated U.S. and allied capabilities
and their employment.46 Further EW specific research is called for.

Battery Signature Management
The survivability of expeditionary advanced base elements will remain a key concern in
any future operating concept. In these engagements, it became clear that the signatures
associated with launch sites and firing batteries are a critical variable of survivability,
especially in the face of increasingly robust adversary ISR capabilities ranging from new
UAV platforms to national technical means and their commercial counterparts. This places
a substantial premium on camouflage, concealment, and deception for forward positions
that by their nature will be within the adversary’s weapons engagement zone; and raises
considerations of rapid hardening options. These dynamics also create new considerations
for elements that may face detect on launch scenarios, where a new requirement may
emerge for missile systems offering reduced signature fires options or operating modes.
Likewise, flight planning considerations will become important where an adversary may
initiate counter-fires using autonomous and loitering munitions along simple back-bearing
vectors, or across other insufficient random features of engagement geometries where the
46
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theoretic advantage of littoral background clutter may be lost in practice. In the cyber
domain, related concerns develop regarding hostile signals intelligence (SIGINT) and
adversary OCO threat, especially where the adversary may be hunting autonomous systems
and high data demand common operating picture architectures.
Within this context, study participants have identified concerns regarding
operations in coalition environments where the adversary may have for years in advance
of crisis pursued the compromise of Allied and partner critical infrastructure networks vital
to supporting advance elements.
This may include local telecommunications
infrastructure, port facilities, and other entities that may provide appropriate contract
logistics support needs. It is anticipated that the adversary will continue to enjoy the greater
opportunities for access and operational preparation of the environment afforded by more
open and commercially oriented societies, in comparison to the more difficult challenges
faced by U.S. and allied planners in considering operations against closed networks
supporting adversary deployment from within denied areas. In this, the future expansion
of the (One) Belt and (One) Road Initiative (OBOR, BRI) may feature as prominent key
network terrain for contested position and future objectives.

Implications and Outlook
This study in many ways validates and restates well known naval combat principles
established since the dawn of the missile age, and in the antecedents of campaigns long
before Goddard’s inventions were adapted for the fleet. It remains clear that the adage “a
ship's a fool to fight a fort” continues to be true, regardless of whether it was Lord Nelson
or Admiral Sir “Jackie” Fisher that said it.47 In control group simulations, the maxim that
the victor “must fire effectively first” is also proven once again.48 Effective fires—in the
form of good hits from attacking munitions—are the sine qua non of sea denial and
associated conventional deterrence achieved through surface to surface missile batteries
deployed as envisioned in expeditionary advanced base operations concepts. These hits
must be achieved even in the face of what will inevitably be robust surface to air missile
and other point defense intercept attempts mounted by the targeted opposing force
formations. The calculus for effective exchanges in salvo warfare involving missile
systems remains at its heart an attrition problem, modified by the fleeting timespan of
specific engagements based on range, detection characteristics, and engagement
geometries.
Offensive cyber operations options promise the potential to change these
calculations in favor of the side that can muster and employ such capabilities to their
advantage. This is by no means an easy problem, and it requires a very different kind of
thinking than is traditional within other warfare communities. There remains substantial
pressure to reduce the complexity, nuance, and unique technical and tactical characteristics
of cyber warfighting to a single expressed variable of “cyber fires” so that such non-kinetic
effects may be treated interchangeably with other fires options by commanders, planners,
and policymakers. These pressures are entirely understandable from the perspectives of
Larrie D. Ferreiro. "Horatio Nelson Never Wrote 'A Ship’s a Fool to Fight a Fort'; It Was Jackie
Fisher Who Invented the Attribution.” Journal of Military History. Vol 83 Issue 3 : pp 855-856.
July 2016.
48
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operational and strategic need. However, this often elides the substantial contest of access,
position, and fleeting opportunity that is required to muster a capability at a given moment
sufficient to allow for its invocation as in the joint and combined fires construct. This
disconnect often gives rise to decision-maker skepticism—if not outright dismissal—
regarding the reliability and repeatability of OCO options. Such reactions may be in part
warranted when a commander has all of the resources, time, and advantage by which to
employ them against an adversary that is only capable of responding by further hiding, or
through asymmetric means. However, when facing a peer competitor that may possess
hardened anti-access / area denial options, superiority in fires ranges, hull counts, warship
tonnage, and afloat weapons systems capabilities it is perhaps wise to consider where
additional options may generate advantage, even if one must accept that such advantage
influences at the margins of specific engagement scenarios.
These features may at first seem to raise fundamental questions about the viability
and purpose of the entire cyber warfighting enterprise, at least in this context. Yet, it is the
very character of contemporary naval engagements that make these impacts at the margins
something well worth striving to achieve. Salvo warfare involving missile exchanges is
notable for tactical instability, arising from concentration of combat power relative to
survivability that results in the difference between loss and victory based on even small
changes between attacker and defender.49 As is clear from simulation results in the
appendix, “Appendix: Simulated Engagement Results,” the changes introduced by select
OCO effects indeed demonstrate the ability to exacerbate this instability to obtain
advantage over the adversary, with greater numbers of adversary vessels damaged or sunk
where OCO options were employed in support of missile fires.
The ability to achieve such advantage is subject to the success of operational action
in and through the cyber domain, overcoming challenges of access, payload delivery, and
effects orchestration in a complex range of targets. It is also subject to limitations of
authorities, equities and associated approval processes not discussed here but that remain
highly salient to potential engagement scenarios.
While the calculation of fires exchanges in Lanchester’s Square Law, Hughes'
salvo combat model, and its successive iterations is familiar to naval officers (and
increasingly now to officers of Marines), the introduction of OCO also introduces another
key set of equations into the full contact math of naval combat. These are the calculations
inherent in the management of the arsenal of cyber capabilities.
Vulnerabilities in deployed systems and networks arise from bugs—defects in
machine or its operation.50 These bugs may be usefully exploitable, and the knowledge of
an exploitation opportunity where the defender is either unaware of its existence, or has
not been able to remediate the underlying vulnerability, is a key feature of offensive cyber
exchange. Likewise, implant payloads intended to execute malicious instructions within
the target system or network are also more useful when not known to the adversary,
reducing probability of detection. However, even known vulnerabilities and previously
observed implants may remain effective against certain targets, due to defender inattention,
misconfiguration, or other factors. The operational choices about when, and how, to
49
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employ these capabilities feature prominently in the management and execution of
offensive cyber operations, balancing tradeoffs of detection versus potential range of
effects options.51 These capabilities also carry an economic value, both on open markets
and closed private exchanges as a commodity, as well as in the investments into research,
development, testing and acquisition.52 In cases where exploit options may have impact
on civilian critical infrastructure and commercial enterprise environments, responsible
states have pursued processes to balance the competing equities in the discovery and
retention of unknown vulnerabilities, and the disclosure of these bugs as warning to private
sector actors that may mitigate their exposure to other adversary action.53
The inventory of 0-days (i.e., unknown, undisclosed vulnerabilities), that may be
viable exploited at any given moment to achieve access against target systems and
networks is not infinite, and may in fact be scarce (although this has proven a difficult
question to answer).54 The population of military useful 0-days (exploitable vulnerabilities
in relevant adversary deployed targets), is presumably smaller yet. Likewise, the options
for operational effects against these targets are also constrained, and where codified into
weaponized implants and tested for validation against threat representative targets, are a
valuable capability which may be degraded following use and detection.55 The manner in
which a capability is used, and the character of its effects, and the capacity of the defender
target may influence the viable lifespan of an OCO option.56 Further, independent
rediscovery of both vulnerabilities, and similar approaches to weaponizing these
vulnerabilities into offensive capabilities portfolios, may result in disclosure by third
parties that effectively removes a capability from the inventory of a cyber command.57
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These factors in combination create challenges for offensive planners and operators, who
face uncertainty over the continued viability of a given capability.58
These considerations are highly salient to potential littoral fires exchanges where
advantage is enabled by OCO capabilities. There is no small peril inherent in operational
concepts that may rely upon transient instantiations of vulnerability that may change over
anticipated lifespan of an adversary’s acquisition, deployment, and spiral development
upgrades of specific military equipment. The calculations of arsenal management in cyber
operations also differ in short, sharp exchanges vice prolonged conflict within a given
theatre. They are changed by joint and allied operations, particularly where coalition
actions are conducted between partners with differing levels of established relationships
and associated trust involving in liaison interactions around what are often closely held
intelligence and cryptologic matters. These calculations may vary where critical target
systems are used in multiple contexts at strategic and tactical levels across multiple
adversaries, where certain options may be more optimally preserved in case of multiple
simultaneous conflicts in different theatres, or against the potential that a conflict may
climb further up the rungs of the escalation ladder.
The difficult challenges of arsenal management are compounded by the
complexities of access, and of sustaining such access, against relevant target systems and
networks. OCO options may require substantial advance lead, especially where they are
intended to deliver impact against isolated, closed networks, including vessels underway.
This rapidly changes the discussion from a question of cyber fires in fleet problems to the
questions of the saboteur’s dilemma. While such matters are easily considered in the
abstract, the realities of such operations at the coal face are often high risk, against long
odds of success, and frequently at great cost to the operators and the supporting elements
involved. These matters often move out of the purely military domain, and beyond the
discussion here.
These factors in summation suggest offensive cyber operations as a component of
littoral and expeditionary advanced base operations in many ways become yet another
iteration of the long familiar continual race of armor versus bullet. The Fleet and the Corps
must recognize that they now compete in this race by virtue of nested requirements that
flow from the new operating concepts. The manner in which this race is run may bring
great advantage if successful, or risk terrible costs if not adequately resourced with
appropriate talent, investment, and command attention.
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Appendix: Simulated Engagement Results
Adversary
CSG
CSG
CSG
CSG
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Weapon
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Tomahawk
GB-ASBM

EMCON
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-

CSG
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Hsiung Feng
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Control
Control
Control

-
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Control
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ASBM
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Type
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Type 054A
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Type
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No

Control

1x Type 001

-
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Control

-
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1x Type 055
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CSG
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CSG

CSG
CSG
CSG
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Damaged
-

1x Type 001
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1x Type 001
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1x Type 901
(heavy)
1x Type 001
(moderate)
-

-

1x
Type
054A
(moderate),
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-

-

-

24

Work: OCO and Future Littoral Operating Concepts

Adversary
CSG

Weapon
Tomahawk

EMCON
No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

Tomahawk

No

CSG

NSM

No

CSG

NSM

No

CSG

NSM

No

CSG

NSM

No

CSG

NSM

No

CSG

NSM

No

CSG

NSM

No

CSG

NSM
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Degraded
radar
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primary sets)
Degraded
point
defense (30mm)
Degraded
point
defense
(HQ10
SAM)
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VLS
(Type 052D)
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VLS
(Type 054A)
Degraded
VLS
(Type 055)
Degraded
VLS
(Type 052D, Type
054A, Type 055)
Degraded radar (set
346)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-710 / TOP
PLATE)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-90 Orekh /
FRONT DOME)
Degraded
radar
(Type 001, set 381
RICE SCREEN)
Degraded
radar
(Type 052D, set
KNIFE REST)
Degraded datalinks

Sunk
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1x Type 001
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-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1x Type 001
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(moderate)
1x Type 001
(moderate)
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1x Type 001
(heavy);
complete loss
of air wing
-
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(Type 052D)
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(Type 054A)
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Degraded
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-

Degraded
radar
(Type 052D, set
KNIFE REST)
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(Type 054A, set
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Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set

-
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Adversary
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Adversary
SAG

Weapon
P-800 Oniks

EMCON
Yes
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Control

SAG
SAG

3M24 (Kh35)
SSC-8
SACCADE
Hsiung Feng
III

No
No

Control
Control

No

Control

SAG

DF-21D
ASBM

No

Control

SAG

DF-26
ASBM

No
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SAG
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NSM
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Yes
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NSM

No

SAG
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-

1x Type 055

-

1x Type 055,
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1x Type 052
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Type
054A
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1x Type 055
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054A
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054A
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-
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Adversary

Weapon

EMCON

OCO Effects
052, set KNIFE
REST)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A and
Type
055,
all
primary sets)
Degraded radar (set
BAND STAND)

SAG

NSM

No

SAG

NSM

No

SAG

NSM

No

SAG

NSM

No

Degraded
point
defense (30mm)
Decoy

SAG

No

Degraded datalinks

SAG
SAG

NSM
plus
HIMARS
Tomahawk
Tomahawk

No
No

SAG

Tomahawk

No

SAG

Tomahawk

No

SAG

Tomahawk

No

SAG

Tomahawk

No

SAG

Tomahawk

No

SAG

Tomahawk

No

SAG

Tomahawk

No

SAG

Tomahawk
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ESG

NSM

No

Degraded datalinks
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A and
Type
055,
all
primary sets)
Degraded CIC (Type
055)
Degraded
radar
(Type 055, set 346)
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VLS
(Type 055, Type
054A)
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radar
(Type 054A, set
BAND STAND)
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radar
(Type 055 and Type
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REST)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-90 Orekh /
FRONT DOME)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-710 / TOP
PLATE)
Degraded
point
defense (30mm)
Control
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Sunk

Damaged

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A,
1x Type 055
1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A,
1x Type 055
1x
Type
052D
-

1x Type 903
(light)

1x
Type
052D
2x
Type
054A,
1x
Type 055
-

1x Type 903
(moderate)

1x
Type
054A (light)
1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A,
1x Type 903
(light)
1x Type 903
(moderate)

-

1x
Type
052D (heavy)
-

1x
Type
054A

1x
Type
054A (heavy)

-

-

-

1x
Type
052D (heavy)

-

-

-

-

-

1x
Type
052D (heavy)
1x
Type
052D
(heavy),
1x
Type
054A
(moderate),

1x Type 022
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Adversary

Weapon

EMCON

OCO Effects

Sunk

Damaged
1x Type 071
(moderate),
1x Type 903
(light)
Type
903
(heavy)

ESG

NSM

Yes

Control

ESG

NSM
plus
HIMARS
Tomahawk
Tomahawk

No

Control

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A,
1x Type 071
-

No
Yes

Control
Control

-

LRASM
Harpoon
Exocet
Hsiung Feng
III
3M24 (Kh35)
SSC-8
SACCADE
DF-26
ASBM
DF-26
ASBM

No
No
No
No

Control
Control
Control
Control

-

1x Type 071
(moderate)
-

No
No

Control
Control

-

-

No

Control

-

Yes

Control

ESG

Tomahawk

No

Degraded datalinks

1x Type 071,
1x Type 903
1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 071,
1x Type 903
-

ESG

Tomahawk

No

ESG

Tomahawk

No

ESG

Tomahawk

No

ESG

Tomahawk

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-90 Orekh /
FRONT DOME)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
BAND STAND)
Degraded
VLS
(Type 054A)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, all
primary sets)

ESG

Tomahawk

No

ESG

DF-26
ASBM

No

ESG

DF-26
ASBM

No

ESG
ESG
ESG
ESG
ESG
ESG
ESG
ESG
ESG
ESG

Degraded
radar
(Type 052D, set
KNIFE REST)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, all
primary sets)
Degraded
radar
(Type 071, set JUG
PAIR)

Published by Digital Commons @ University of South Florida, 2022

1x
Type
054A,
1x
Type 071
1x
Type
054A,
1x
Type 071
1x Type 071
2x Type 022,
1x
Type
054A,
1x
Type 071
-

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 071,
1x Type 903
1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 071,
1x Type 903

-

-

1x Type 071
(heavy)
1x Type 052
(heavy),
1x Type 903
(moderate)
1x Type 903
(moderate)
1x Type 903
(moderate)
-

1x
Type
054A (heavy)
-

-
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Adversary
ESG

Weapon
NSM

EMCON
No

OCO Effects
Degraded datalinks

Sunk
1x Type 022,
1x Type 071

ESG

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type
054,
all
primary sets)

ESG

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-710 / TOP
PLATE)

1x Type 022,
1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 071,
1x Type 903
1x Type 022,
1x
Type
054A,
1x Type 071

ESG

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-90 Orekh /
FRONT DOME)

2x Type 022,
1x
Type
054A

ESG

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
BAND STAND)

1x Type 022,
1x
Type
052D

ESG

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 052D, set
KNIFE REST)

ESG

NSM

No

Degraded
(Type 054A)

1x Type 022,
1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A,
1x Type 071
2x Type 022,
1x Type 071

ESG

NSM

No

Degraded
point
defense (30mm)

1x Type 022,
1x Type 071

Convoy

NSM

No

Control

-

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol5/iss1/3

VLS

Damaged
1x
Type
052D
(heavy),
1x
Type
054A
(moderate),
1x Type 903
(moderate)
-

1x
Type
052D
(heavy),
1x Type 903
(moderate)
1x
Type
052D
(moderate),
1x Type 071
(heavy),
1x Type 903
(moderate)
1x
Type
054A
(moderate),
1x Type 071
(heavy)
1x Type 903
(light)

1x
Type
052D
(heavy),
1x
Type
054A
(moderate),
1x Type 903
(moderate)
1x
Type
052D
(heavy),
1x Type 903
(moderate)
1x
Type
052D
(heavy),
1x
Type
054A
(moderate),
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Adversary

Weapon

EMCON

OCO Effects

Sunk

Convoy

NSM

Yes

Control

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A

Convoy

LRASM

No

Control

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A

Convoy

LRASM

Yes

Control

Convoy

3M54T
Kalibr

No

Control

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A,
1x merchant
1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A,
1x merchant

Convoy

Hsiung Feng
III

No

Control

1x
Type
052D,
1x
merchant

Convoy

3M24 (Kh35)

No

Control

-

Convoy

P-800 Oniks

No

Control

Convoy

SSC-8
SACCADE

No

Control

1x
Type
054A,
2x merchant
-

Convoy

Khalij Fars
ASBM

No

Control

1x
Type
052D

Convoy

NSM

No

Degraded datalinks

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A

Published by Digital Commons @ University of South Florida, 2022

Damaged
2x merchant
(heavy),
1x merchant
(light)
3x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(heavy)
2x merchant
(light),
2x
merchant
(heavy)
2x merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
1x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
2x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(heavy)
1x
Type
052D,
2x
merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
2x merchant
(light)
2x merchant
(light),
1x
merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
1x
Type
054A
(moderate),
3x merchant
(moderate)
2x merchant
(light),
1x
merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
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Adversary
Convoy

Weapon
NSM

EMCON
No

OCO Effects
Degraded merchant
propulsion,
separating 2 vessels
from escorts
Degraded
VLS
(Type 054A)

Sunk
1x
Type
052D,
1x
merchant

Convoy

NSM

No

Convoy

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-90 Orekh /
FRONT DOME)

1x
Type
054A

Convoy

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-710 / TOP
PLATE)

1x
Type
052D

Convoy

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
BAND STAND)

-

Convoy

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, all
primary sets)

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A

Convoy

NSM

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 052D, set
KNIFE REST)

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A

Convoy

Tomahawk

No

Control

-

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol5/iss1/3

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A

Damaged
3x merchant
(light),
1x
merchant
(moderate)
2x merchant
(light),
1x
merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
1x
Type
052D
(heavy), 2x
merchant
(light),
1x
merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
1x
Type
054A
(moderate),
1x merchant
(light),
2x
merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
1x
Type
052D
(heavy), 1x
Type 054A
(moderate),
2x merchant
(light),
1x
merchant
(moderate)
2x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
2x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(moderate),
1x merchant
(heavy)
2x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(moderate),
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Adversary

Weapon

EMCON

OCO Effects

Sunk

Convoy

Tomahawk

Yes

Control

-

Convoy

Tomahawk

No

Degraded datalinks

1x
Type
052D,
2x
merchant

Convoy

Tomahawk

No

Degraded
(Type 054A)

Convoy

Tomahawk

No

1x
Type
054A,
2x merchant

Convoy

Tomahawk

No

Convoy

Tomahawk

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-90 Orekh /
FRONT DOME)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
MR-710 / TOP
PLATE)
Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, set
BAND STAND)

Convoy

Tomahawk

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 054A, all
primary sets)

Raiders

NSM

No

Control

Raiders

NSM

Yes

Control

Raiders

Harpoon

No

Control

Raiders

Exocet

No

Control

Raiders

NSM

No

Degraded datalinks

Raiders

NSM

No

Raiders

NSM

No

Raiders

Tomahawk

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 056, set 363)
Degraded
point
defense
(HQ10
SAM)
Control

1x
Type
052D,
1x
Type 054A,
1x merchant
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056

Raiders

Tomahawk

Yes

Control

Raiders

Tomahawk

No

Degraded datalinks

Raiders

Tomahawk

No

Degraded
radar
(Type 056, set 363)

Published by Digital Commons @ University of South Florida, 2022

VLS

1x merchant

1x merchant

4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056

Damaged
1x merchant
(heavy)
2x merchant
(light),
2x merchant
(moderate)
2x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(moderate)
3x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(heavy)
2x merchant
(light)

2x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(moderate)
2x merchant
(light),
1x merchant
(moderate)
1x merchant
(light),
2x merchant
(moderate)
-

-
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Adversary
Raiders

Weapon
Tomahawk

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol5/iss1/3

EMCON
No

OCO Effects
Degraded
point
defense
(HQ10
SAM)

Sunk
4x Type 022,
1x Type 056

Damaged
-
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